Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base
Chronology and History
by
Jim Traywick 

 


 
Takhli Time Table
Historical Records of Takhli Royal Thai Air Base, Thailand

The events occurring at Takhli Air Base are referenced in many sources.  Each event will be presented in the chronological sequence it is reported to have happened.  The date will be reflected by year, month and day.  The event will be entered and the source of the information will be cited following the event description.  They will be copied verbatim without editorial remarks or criticism of the action, statement or decision.  This record is compiled for Wing 4, Takhli Royal Thai Air Base, Thailand.
 
1962   May
F-100s from Cannon and England Air Force Bases begin rotational temporary duty here.  The
United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, The Advisory Years to 1965, p 280.

1962  May 13
FIELD GLASS  On 13 May a Clark Air Base F-100 detachment was deployed to Takhli Royal
Thai Air Force Base, Thailand in response to an increasing threat along the Laotian border.
On May 16 the rest of the 510th Tactical Fighter Squadron deployed to Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base from Clark.  The project was called FIELD GLASS.  On 7 June, they were
replaced by a TDY squadron of F-100's from Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico.  Pacific
Air Forces: Fifty Years in Defense of the Nation, p 60.

1962 July
6011th Air Base Squadron organized. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, The
Advisory Years to 1965, p 280.

1963 Feb
SAW BUCK in Thailand Reduced.  During February the SAW BUCK rotational squadron of
F-100's at Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base reduced to six aircraft. Pacific Air Forces: Fifty
Years In Defense of the Nation, p 65  / SAW BUCK  United States Tactical Air Command
composite air strike force deployment to Southeast Asia in mid-1962 and afterward. (SAW
BUCK Definition from The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, The Advisory Years to
1965, p 341)

1963 July
331st Air Base Squadron ( 35th Tactical Group ) replaces 6011th Air Base Squadron. The
United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, The Advisory Years to 1965, p 280.

1964 Jun 8
F-100'S Deploy to Southeast Asia. Six F-100's deploy from Clark Air Base to Takhli Royal
Thai Air Base on 8 June. Pacific Air Forces: Fifty Years In Defense of the Nation, p 69

1964 Aug.
Detachment 1, 421st Air Refueling Squadron, organized.  The United States Air Force in
Southeast Asia, The Advisory Years to 1965, p 280.

1964 Aug.
The 405th Tactical Wing sent ten F-100s from Clark to Takhli, Thailand.  ( The Gulf of
Tonkin Incident ) The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, The Advisory Years to
1965, p 229.

1965
The USAF presence in Thailand was small at the start of 1965.  Air defense of the country
was provided by four F-102s from Don Muang Airport outside Bangkok.  Farther up-country,
a squadron of F-105s at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base ( RTAFB ) and another at Takhli
RTAFB flew against the infiltration routes in the Laotian panhandle. The United States Air
Force in Southeast Asia, The Advisory Years to 1965, p 268.

1965 Sept
Increasing Demands for Fuel.  The first of these expansions occurred in September 1965
when Tankers moved to Takhli under the designation of King Cobra and supplemented those
at Don Muang in refueling the Thai-based fighters.  By the end of 1965, there were about 55
tankers in the western Pacific: 40 at Kadena, 10 at Takhli, and 5 at Don Muang. The United
States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961 - 1973, p 205.

1965 Nov 1
355 Tactical Fighter Wing.  Moved to Takhli from McConnell AFB, Kansas, and assigned to
the 13 Air Force.  Pacific Air Forces: Fifty Years In Defense of the Nation, p 300 / Based at
Takhli AB, Thailand, 8 November 1965 to 10 December 1970.  Replaced 6235th Tactical
Fighter Wing.  Inactivated 10 December 1970. The United States Air Force in Southeast
Asia, 1961 - 1973, p 346.

1965 Nov 8
Col. William H. Holt assumes command 355 Tactical Fighter Wing.  Change of Command 4
Aug. 1966. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961 - 1973, p 346.

1966 Aug. 4
Col. Robert R. Scott assumes command 355 Tactical Fighter Wing.  Change of Command 1
August 1967. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961 - 1973, p 346.

1967 Jan
On January 1967, the 4258th Strategic Wing assumed full responsibility for the U-Tapao
operations; a month later it assumed control of the Takhli tankers formerly belonging to the
4252d.  The 4252d at Kadena supported ARC LIGHT bombers and the 4258th at U-Tapao
and Takhli refueled fighters.  At years end, the tanker force numbered approximately 80 - 45
of them at Kadena, 30 at U-Tapao, and 5 at Takhli.  Southeast Asia aerial refueling statistics
during 1967 were again impressive, with approximately 22,891 sorties and more than
103,415 in-flight transfers involving more than 1 billion pounds of fuel.  The United States
Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961 - 1973, p 205.

1967 Mar 10
Twin MiG Killer.  Capt. Max C. Brestel, an F-105 pilot of the 355 Tactical Fighter Wing at
Takhli became the first twin MiG-killer of the war when he shot down two MiG-17's during a
10 March mission. Pacific Air Forces: Fifty Years In Defense of the Nation, p 80

1967 Mar 10
Capt Merlyn H. Dethlefsen / Congressional Medal of Honor Mission
USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series Vol. VII  Monograph 9, Air Force Heroes in Vietnam,
p 25-29

Capt Merlyn H. Dethlefsen / Congressional Medal of Honor Mission 10 March 1967
On March 10, 1967, a flight of F-105 Thunderchiefs took off from Takhli Royal Thai Air
Force Base.  Captain Merlyn Hans Dethlefsen eased the number three Thud into position as
the four-ship formation headed north.  This was his 78th combat mission.

Over 500 miles away, in the North Vietnamese heartland, lay the Thai Nguyen steel mill and
industrial complex.  Nestled in a valley 40 miles north of Hanoi, and 70 miles from the Red
Chinese border, the heavily defended complex was a vital cog in Ho Chi Minh's war machine.
It had only recently been approved as a target for US fighter-bombers.  Four Thunderchiefs,
with the call sign "Lincoln," were scheduled to be the first flight on target that day.  Their
mission was to knock out the lethal defenses that ringed the target: surface to air missiles
(SAMs), antiaircraft artillery (AAA), and automatic weapons.  There was also a good
possibility that the Thuds would be greeted by Soviet- and Chinese-built MiG interceptors.

The flight leader and Captain Dethlefsen each piloted two-seat Thunderchiefs for the wild
weasel mission.  As they neared hostile territory the back seater, or "bear," would be busy
scanning his gear for the telltale signals that could pinpoint North Vietnamese defenses.

On schedule, the F-105 pilots rendezvoused with a tanker and refueled.  They departed the
tanker just five minutes ahead of the main strike force and prepared to cross the enemy
border, hoping the good weather would hold.

Fighter pilots who had survived many missions over the north had developed a sound combat
tactic.  They would strike the target quickly, delivering their ordnance on one pass, then pull
off, using maximum power and violent evasive maneuvers, to head for home.  Merl
Dethlefsen had used this formula many times and had never been hit by flak.  Those who
attempted a second pass on the target often did not live to tell about it.

Lincoln had guided his formation at medium altitude to the north of Thai Nguyen.  About two
miles from the target, they zoomed for altitude and rolled into a steep diving attack on the
active SAM site.  Merl and his wingman were nearly a mile behind the first element when
they lost sight of the leader in the most intense flak imaginable.  The number two ship broke
hard to the right and Merl followed, A moment later, the parachute beeper signal on the
emergency radio channel confirmed that the lead crew had ejected from their crippled
aircraft.

Number two, trying desperately to escape from the hornet's nest around Thai Nguyen,
reported that his Thud had been badly damaged.

Merl Dethlefsen took command of the flight.  He remembers, " We were still ahead of the
strike force and they (the strike force) were still vulnerable.  We had fuel and missiles, guns
and bombs, and the job wasn't done yet.  Lincoln lead had seen the target and launched a
missile, but it had missed.  I decided we would stay.  Coming around, I studied the flak
pattern.  It wasn't a matter of being able to avoid the flak, but of finding the least-intense
areas."

Captain Dethlefsen's wingman, Major Kenneth Bell recalls, "We sometimes had targets
where we got no flak at all.  Apparently the enemy didn't care about them.  But this one
was different.  When we got that kind of greeting at That Nguyen you know we were hitting
something they wanted to hang on to.  It was a vital target and its loss would hurt them."

Merl and his backseater, Captain Kevin "Mike" Gilroy, had located the approximate position
of the SAM site on the first pass.  As he maneuvered the aircraft to line up with the target,
Merl spotted two MiG-21s closing fast from the rear quadrant.  He fired his radar-seeking
missile at the SAM site and veered sharply away as one of the MiGs triggered a missile
toward the Thud.

Dethlefsen described how he shook off the attackers, "I broke to the right, down through the
flak.  I figured that would give me the best chance of evading both the heat-seeking missile
and the MiGs' guns.  Didn't think the MIGs would want to follow me through that stuff.
They didn't."

It was standard procedure for F-105 pilots under attack by MIGs to jettison their ordnance,
engage the afterburner, and head for the treetops, where the Thud could outrace the
interceptors.  The heavy fighter bomber was no match for the maneuverable MiG in a
dogfight.

As Merl repositioned for another pass he saw two more MiG 21s and evaded them with a
tight left break.  He elected to retain his ordnance, but now he had another problem.

The antiaircraft artillery had taken its toll.  At least one of the 57-millimeter gunners had
scored a bullseye, jolting the Thud with a direct hit.  Miraculously, the flight controls and
engine responded normally as Captain Dethlefsen checked his aircraft out.  Chunks of
shrapnel through the bottom of the Thud's fuselage and the left wingtip had not damaged
any of her vital systems.  The two-man crew again turned their attention to the SAM site,
and Merl remembers that the main force was already leaving the industrial complex.

"I could hear the strike force withdrawing.  I had permission to stay there after they left.
That steel mill with the related industry was too big a target-too big to knock out with one
strike.  I knew those fighter-bombers would be back tomorrow.  Same route, right over this
area.  My aircraft was working well enough to be effective.  With the weather the way it
was that day I knew we would never have a better chance.  So I made up my mind to stay
until I got that SAM site or they, got me."

Maneuvering around the flak pattern, Merl spotted another SAM site dead ahead.  He
squeezed off a missile and the SAM radar shut down.

Smoke and dust from the main strike on the complex began to drift over the defensive
positions as the pilot and his bear strained to spot the original SAM site.  Merl eased the
streaking Thunderchief down on the deck for a better look.

Throughout the harrowing sequence of events, Ken Bell had stuck to his leader like glue.  His
105 had been hit by both AAA and a MiG.  Because of a damaged aileron, Ken could turn his
Thud only to the right as he followed Merlyn Dethlefsen down the chute once more.

At last the weasel delivered the knockout punch.  Merl dropped his bombs squarely on the
site and followed with a cannon pass, his 20-millimeter gun blazing away.  The SAM site
burned as the 105s pulled off.

The two battle-weary Thuds sped toward the tanker and home station.  Pilots who would fly
over Thai Nguyen on another day were glad that Captain Dethlefsen had stayed.

"All I did was the job I was sent to do," Dethlefsen said.  "It had been quite a while since we
had been able to go into the Hanoi area.  So While the weather held we were able to do
some pretty good work.  It was a case of doing my job to the best of my ability.  I think that
is what we mean when we call ourselves professional airmen in the Air Force."

Merl Dethlefsen's understatement of his heroic contribution reflects the attitude of the pilots
who risked their lives daily over the north.  Each considered himself a part of the team.  The
destruction of vital targets in the enemy's stronghold would never be a one-man operation.
USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series Vol. VII  Monograph 9, Air Force Heroes in Vietnam,
p 25-29

1967 Apr 19
Major Leo K. Thorsness / Congressional Medal of Honor Mission
USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series Vol. VII  Monograph 9, Air Force Heroes in Vietnam,
p 29-31

Major Leo K. Thorsness / Congressional Medal of Honor Mission April 19, 1967
Six weeks after Captain Dethlefsen had silenced the enemy defenses around Thai Nguyen,
another weasel pilot took off from Takhli.  Major Leo K. Thorsness and his back-seater,
Captain Harold E. Johnson were nearing the 100-mission mark that would bring their combat
tour to an end.

Leo was the "old head" weasel pilot at Takhli and the instructor for newly assigned crews.
MiGs had chased Leo and Harry, through the skies of' North Vietnam, and the experienced
pair had evaded 53 SAMs.  Describing the flak-and SAM-suppression missions, Leo said, "In
essence, we would go in high enough to let somebody shoot at us and low enough to go
down and get them; then went in and got them."  The weasels would be the first flight on
target, preceding the main attack and remaining after the strike force had departed.  It was
like trolling for sharks in a canoe!

On 19 April 1967, Leo led his flight of four Thuds from the tanker in southern Laos toward
the North Vietnamese border.  They were headed for the Xuan Mai army barracks and
storage supply area 30 miles to the southwest of Hanoi.  Xuan Mai lay on the edge of the
Red River delta, where rice paddies give way to forested mountains.  Hopefully, the defenses
would not be as lethal as those ringing downtown Hanoi.

The rattlesnake tone in Leo's headset buzzed in time with the flickering strobes on Harry's
scope.  The eerie sound signaled that already the enemy missile crews were warming up the
SAM radar's -and searching for American aircraft.  The rattlesnake whined louder and the
strobes got bigger as the weasels flew deeper into North Vietnam.

Though the bear's warning gear detected the SAM tracking and guidance radar's, the weasel
crews had no guaranteed cockpit indication of a launch.  If they were lucky, they would spot
the lethal "telephone pole" rising from its pad in a cloud of dust.  If they were not so lucky,
they would find the missile while there was still time to avoid it with a desperation
maneuver.  If their luck had run out, the missile would streak in undetected from behind, and
its high-explosive war-head would shatter the unsuspecting Thunderchief.

Leo sent his number 3 and 4 men to the north of' Xuan Mai as he and number 2 headed to
the south.  Now the enemy gunners would be forced to divide their attention between the
separated flights.

Major Thorsness maneuvered toward a strong SAM signal and fired a radar-seeking Shrike
missile.  The site was seven miles distant and obscured by haze, so Leo and Harry never saw
the missile hit.  But the abrupt disappearance of' the enemy's signal from Harry's scope
indicated that the Shrike had probably done it's job.

Leo picked up a second SAM site visually and rolled into a diving attack through a curtain of
AAA fire.  He pickled his CBUs (cluster bomb units) dead on target and pulled out of the
steep dive.

The two Thuds accelerated toward the treetops where they would have the best chance for
survival.  But number 2 was in trouble.  Antiaircraft rounds had found Tom Madison's
machine, and the glowing overheat light confirmed that his engine had been hit.  Leo told to
Tom head for the hills to the west, but the rescue beeper on guard (emergency) radio
channel signaled that Madison and his back-seater Tom Sterling, had already bailed out.
Somehow Leo found time in the midst of the emergency to fire another Shrike at a third
SAM site.

To the north numbers 3 and 4 had survived the air battle with MiG interceptors.  Number 3's
afterburner would not light, and without the added thrust the flight could not sustain the
supersonic speed to outrun their attackers.  Somehow 3 and 4 staved off' two more MiGs as
they limped south toward Takhli.  Leo's Thud was now the only fighter-bomber in the Xuan
Mai area.

Major Thorsness circled the descending parachutes while Harry relayed information to
"Crown," the rescue control aircraft.  Suddenly Harry spotted a MiG off their left wing, and
Leo recalls, "I wasn't sure whether or not he was going to attack the parachutes.  So I said,
'Why not?' and took off after him.  I was a little high, dropped down to 1,000 feet and
headed north behind him.  I was driving right up his tailpipe at 550 knots.  At about 3,000
feet I opened up on him with the 20 millimeter but completely missed him.  We attacked
again, and I was pulling and holding the trigger when Harry got my attention with the MiGs
behind us.  If I had hit that MiG good we would have swallowed some of the explosion
(debris).  But we got him."

Low on gas, Leo sped south toward the tanker, following the progress of the rescue forces
on his radio.  The prop-driven Sandys that would direct the on-scene effort and the rescue
helicopters that would attempt the pick-up were already headed toward the downed weasel
crew.

With full tanks but with only 500 rounds of ammunition, Leo left the tanker and flew north
again.  While briefing the Sandy pilots on the defenses around Xuan Mai, he spotted three
interceptors ahead.

"One of the MiGs flew right into my gunsight at about 2,000 feet and pieces started failing
off the (enemy) aircraft.  They hadn't seen us, but they did now."

Harry warned that four MiGs were closing from the rear and Leo dove for the deck, eluding
his pursuers as the Thud raced through the mountain passes with the afterburner blazing.

Now the MiGs turned back toward the slow-moving Sandys and Thorsness radioed a
warning, "Okay, Sandy One. Just keep that machine of yours turning and they can't get
you."  Low on fuel again and without ammunition, Leo turned toward the MiGs with one idea
in mind:  "To try to get them on me." He knew the Sandys would be sitting ducks for the
MiGs.

At last a flight of 105s arrived, and now the MiGs were on the defensive.  By evening, the
Americans claimed the MiG that Leo had killed plus four probable, including the enemy
aircraft that had flown in front of Leo's deadly guns.

The 1,000-foot flames and billowing smoke from Xuan Mai could be seen over 40 miles
away - a silent testimony to the success of the airstrike.

But Major Thorsness was far from satisfied as he flew toward the tanker for the third time.
A Sandy had been shot down, and the rescue effort for Madison and Sterling had been called
off.  Both were later captured.  Now Leo faced yet another crucial decision.

"Leo, I'm not with the rest of the flight, and I don't know where I am.  I've only got 800
pounds (of fuel).  What should I do?" It was a fellow Thud pilot in trouble.

"I've never felt so sorry for anyone, " recounts Thorsness.  "It wasn't unusual to get lost in
battle, and any number of things could happen in a fight to use an awful lot of fuel.  But it
sounded like I would have to do something magic."

What Leo did was send the tanker north toward the lost pilot.  Thankfully, the rendezvous
was successful and the pilot plugged into the tanker before the gas-gulping engine flamed
out from fuel starvation.  But now Leo was critically low on gas as he continued south
toward the nearest recovery base at Udorn, Thailand.

"I knew if we could get to the Mekong River - the Fence - we could coast across.  With 70
miles to go, I pulled the power back to idle and we just glided in.  We were indicating
'empty' when the runway came up just in front of us, and we landed a little long.  As we
climbed out of the cockpit, Harry said something quaint like, 'That's a full day's work!'"

1967 May
More MiG Kills.  Five ( 5 ) by the 355 Tactical Fighter Wing.  Pacific Air Forces: Fifty Years In
Defense of the Nation, p 82

1967 Aug 2
Col. John C. Giraudo assumes command 355 Tactical Fighter Wing.  Change of Command
29 Jun 1968. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia 1961 - 1973. p 346.

1967 Aug 11
Raid on Hanoi Railroad and Highway Bridge.  Thirty-six strike aircraft led by the 355th at
Takhli.  They dropped 94 tons of bombs and destroyed one rail span and two highway spans
on the northeast side of the bridge.  The superstructure was damaged and the highway
portion on the north side of the bridge , where it crossed the island in the river, was cut.
This stopped the movement of an average of 26 trains per day with an estimated capacity of
5,950 short tons.  Two aircraft were damaged, but no pilots were lost.   The heart of the
North Vietnamese transportation system had been dealt a severe blow.  The Tale of Two
Bridges and the Battle for the Skies Over North Vietnam, p 75.

1968
F-111A's of the 428 TFS at Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base. Pacific Air Forces: Fifty Years
In Defense of the Nation, p 87
 
1968 Feb
CCK (Ching Chuan Kang Air Base ) entered the scene in February when the 4200th Air
Refueling Squadron was activated with tankers formerly based at Takhli. The United States
Air Force in Southeast Asia 1961 - 1973. p 206.

1968 Jun 30
Col. Michael C. Horgan assumes command 355 Tactical Fighter Wing.  Change of Command
26 Jun 1969. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia 1961 - 1973. p 346.

1969 Jun 27
Col. Heath Bottomly assumes command 355 Tactical Fighter Wing.  Change of Command 14
Jun 1970. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia 1961 - 1973. p 346.

1969 Oct
F-105's Consolidated.  during October, the 44 TFS moved from Korat to Takhli, thus
consolidating all Southeast Asia F-105 assets at one base. Pacific Air Forces: Fifty Years In
Defense of the Nation, p 98

1970
Thud Wing at Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base.  The 355 TFW ceased combat operations at
Takhli on 7 October, and on the 12th, the wing retired it's colors with a 12-aircraft flyover
of F-105s.  The wing and its associated units inactivated 10 December.  Most of the aircraft
were moved to McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas, but some went to Kadena Air Base and
the 18 TFW.  The only F-105s remaining in PACAF were the Wild Weasels at Korat and a
few aircraft assigned to the 12 TFS at Kadena. Pacific Air Forces: Fifty Years In Defense of
the Nation, p 105

1970 Jun 15
Col. Clarence E. Anderson, Jr. assumes command of  355 Tactical Fighter Wing. Deactivated
10 Dec 1970. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia 1961 - 1973. p 346.

1970 Sept
Wild Weasel squadrons.  In September, Det 1, 12 TFS, moved to Korat from Takhli with six
F-105G Wild Weasel aircraft.  The unit was redesignated as the 6010th Wild Weasel
Squadron on 1 November. Pacific Air Forces: Fifty Years In Defense of the Nation, p 104

1970 Dec 10
355 TFW - Inactivated at Takhli, 10 Dec Pacific Air Forces: Fifty Years In Defense of the
Nation, p 101
 
1972
The 1972 Surge   The North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam during the spring and
summer months of 1972 prompted expanded B-52 and tactical air operations and a
concomitant surge in air refueling.  The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia 1961 -
1973. p 207.
 
1972 Apr
In April 1972, after North Vietnam launched it's spring offensive into South Vietnam, the Air
Force dispatched the 49th Tactical Fighter Wing from Holloman AFB, N. M. to Takhli,
Thailand ( Operation Constant Guard ). The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia 1961 -
1973. p 198.
 
1972 Apr-Jun
During the five week period in April and May, TAC deployed nine squadrons to the area.
Approximately 150 tankers supported these deployments on schedule with no fighter being
delayed for lack of fuel.  Accordingly, in May and June, 70 additonal KC-135's deployed to
Clark and to three Thai bases - Don Muang, Takhli and Korat.  The United States Air Force in
Southeast Asia 1961 - 1973. p 208.
 
1972 Jun 15
366 Tactical Fighter Wing.  Moved to Takhli. Pacific Air Forces: Fifty Years In Defense of the
Nation, p 300
 
1972 Jun 27
Transfers.  366 TFW - DaNang Air Base to Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base, June.  366
TFW - Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base to Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, October.
Pacific Air Forces: Fifty Years In Defense of the Nation, p 112 / 300
 
1972 Oct 31
366 TFW .  Moved from Takhli without personnel and equipment to Moutain Home AFB,
Idaho. Pacific Air Forces: Fifty Years In Defense of the Nation, p 300
 
1972 Dec
In December 1972, when the United States resumed the large scale bombing of North
Vietnam, the tanker force increased again, to approximately 195.  Major increases at Kadena
supported the growing B-52 flights from Andersen.  Other tankers were sent to Takhli and to
a new detachment at Clark. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia 1961 - 1973. p
208.

1973 Jan-Feb
With the suspension of bombing in North Vietnam and the resumption of peace negotiations,
inflight refueling requirements decreased markedly.  As a result, in late January 1973 many
of the augmentee tankers including those at Clark returned to their home bases.  In February,
others returned home after being withdrawn from Takhli, Kadena, and Andersen.  The United
States Air Force in Southeast Asia 1961 - 1973. p 208.
 
1973 Jul 30
347 Tactical Fighter Wing.  Activated at Takhli RTAFB, Thailand, assigned to Thirteenth Air
Force. Pacific Air Forces: Fifty Years In Defense of the Nation, p 300
 
1973 Jul
Reductions in Southeast Asia Continue.  Other major changes in PACAF's structure in 1973
included the reassignment of two squadrons from TAC's 474 TFW to the 347 TFW at Takhli
Royal Thai Air Force Base in July.  The 347 TFW was equipped with F-111A's. Pacific Air
Forces: Fifty Years In Defense of the Nation, p 117
 
1973 Aug
An F-111A taxis to the runway at Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand, on 15 August
1973, for final mission of Constant Guard. Pacific Air Forces: Fifty Years In Defense of the
Nation, p 117
 
1974 Jan
Reductions in Southeast Asia.  On 31 January, the Secretary of Defense announced a
realignment of Thailand resources, with the final pullout of air resources by the end of 1976.
Major changes in PACAF during the year included:  347 TFW - from Takhli to Korat in July.
Pacific Air Forces: Fifty Years In Defense of the Nation, p 112
 
1974 June
Commando Sting.  Four F-111s from the 347 TFW flew from Takhli to Osan Air Base in
early June and conducted live weapons demonstrations for Republic of Korea and US
officials at Nightmare Range on 11,12, and 13 Jun. Pacific Air Forces: Fifty Years In
Defense of the Nation, p 123

1974 Jul 12
347 TFW Moved to Korat. Pacific Air Forces: Fifty Years In Defense of the Nation, p 300

1974 Sept 12
Takhli Closed Again.  The phase down of operations at Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base was
completed ahead of schedule, and the base was officially returned to the Thai Government
on 12 September.  All remaining US personnel departed on 14 September. Pacific Air Forces:
Fifty Years In Defense of the Nation, p 124

1982 Dec
Commando West V.  The first visit of a PACAF tactical unit to Thailand in many years took
place from 13 - 17 December.  The 90 TFS deployed six F-4Es to Takhli Royal Thai Air Force
Base, and flew a total of 55 sorties with the Royal Thai Air Force. Pacific Air Forces: Fifty
Years In Defense of the Nation, p 154
 
1983 Nov
Commando West VI.  On 25 November six F-4Es from the 3TFW's 3TFS deployed to Takhli
Royal Thai Air Force Base for dissimilar air combat tactics training with the Royal Thai Air
Force.  The group returned to Clark Air Base on 5 December. Pacific Air Forces: Fifty Years
In Defense of the Nation, p 157

Information Compiled by: James L. Traywick, Major, USAF (Ret)
Presently assigned to:  613 Air Operations Squadron, Exercise Plans Office
13th Air Force      Andersen Air Force Base, Guam  96543
e-mail  Jim at: traywick@ite.net

For more of Jim's writings and an update on life at Takhli in the 1990's see his writeups on Cobra Gold via the Talkhi History Page. (coming soon)

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 update  18 aug  98